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CASES NOTED
been construed by the United States Supreme Court to allow an
unrestricted right to strike, although one federal district court has
so held." It should be noted that Wilson v. Sandstrom itself does
not present the problem of the outer limits of the thirteenth
amendment in this area since the kennel owners themselves were
incarcertated for not working, rather than the more ordinary prob-
lem of union officials who are jailed for calling illegal strikes. How-
ever, Wilson v. Sandstrom may presage an increasing tension be-
tween an individual's thirteenth amendment rights and society's
dependence on that individual's services.
HARLEY S. TROPIN
Contribution Act Construed-Should Joint And
Several Liability Have Been Considered First?
This article examines the various issues and legal concepts
regarding apportionment of damages between parties presented
in a recent Supreme Court of Florida decision. The relationship
between comparative negligence, joint and several liability, and
contribution among joint tortfeasors is discussed. The author is
critical of the court's focusing its analysis on the collateral issue
of contribution among tortfeasors rather than on the central issue
of the case-joint and several liability. In addition, the potential
inconsistencies between the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act and the underlying principles of Hoffman v. Jones are
noted, and the author urges resolution of those conflicts.
Two automobiles collided at an intersection resulting in injury
to a passenger in one of the automobiles. Issen, the injured passen-
ger, brought suit against Lincenberg, the driver-owner of the car in
could, because of "ancient usage," constitutionally require able-bodied men to work on public
roads); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (proscription of involuntary servitude was
not intended to apply to sailors' contracts, because of the "exceptional nature" of the sailors'
duties). It is doubtful, however, that the occupation of racing greyhounds falls into any of
the "historical exceptions."
38. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849 (N.D. Ill. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); see Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUSTON L. REv. 593, 604: "A constitutional right to strike may
well be derived from the proscription of involuntary servitude contained in the thirteenth
amendment, as reenforced by the first amendment guarantees of free speech and peaceful
assembly."
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which Issen was a passenger,' and against Ronald and Eleanor
Rhodes, the driver and owner of the other car, respectively. The jury
found that the plaintiff was free of negligence, that both defendant
drivers were negligent, and that each was a contributing legal cause
of plaintiff's injuries. The jury further found, in response to special
interrogatories, that Lincenberg's negligence represented 15 percent
and Rhodes' negligence 85 percent of the liability. Plaintiff's dam-
ages were affixed at $20,000. Defendant Lincenberg contended that,
in light of the Hoffman v. Jones' decision implementing compara-
tive negligence and apportionment principles in Florida, judgments
should be entered against the defendants only to the extent that
each was found to be at fault rather than adjudging them both
jointly and severally liable for the entire amount.' The trial judge
certified to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, the ques-
tion4 as to whether such an apportionment should be made by the
jury and whether the special interrogatories were proper. The Third
District answered in the negative, finding that the doctrine of com-
parative negligence generally is not applicable between defendant
joint tortfeasors, and noting that Florida did not even allow contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors.5
On conflict certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Florida
quashed the Third District's opinion and held: The case is con-
trolled by the recently passed Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act (Uniform Act).' In construing the Uniform Act, the court
1. Florida's automobile guest statute had been repealed prior to the suit. Fla. Laws 1972,
ch. 72-1, § 1, repealing FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1971).
2. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), noted in 28 U.MIAMI L. REV. 473 (1974).
3. The status quo in Florida had been the imposition of joint and several liability for
concurrent negligence in automobile accidents. See, e.g., De La Concha v. Pinero, 104 So.2d
25 (Fla. 1958); Nichols v. Rothkopf, 135 Fla. 749, 185 So. 725 (1939); Booth v. Mary Carter
Paint Co., 182 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
4. The trial judge certified the following question to the District Court of Appeal, Third
District:
"Where the plaintiff, in an automobile injury accident case sues two defendants,
alleging both to be negligent resulting in injuries to the plaintiff, is it proper for
the trial judge to allow the jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between the
negligent defendants, therefore, was it proper in a case wherein the plaintiff sued
two defendants, alleging each negligently operated to instruct the jury to appor-
tion fault and submit the foregoing special interrogatories to the jury?"
Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
5. Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975). Subsection 7 provides:
This act shall apply to all causes of action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the
[Vol. 30:747
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held that in determining the amount plaintiff should recover, the
comparative negligence jury instructions should provide that the
percentage of all defendants' negligence should be taken as a whole
in comparing it to the plaintiff's negligence.' Therefore, special ver-
dicts as to each defendant's percentage of fault are improper except
in limited instances;" and, with respect to any contribution, appor-
tionment of damages will be on a pro rata basis.' Lincenberg v.
Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).10
rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors is involved and to cases thereafter
filed.
Petitioner argued in its Petition for Rehearing, which was subsequently withdrawn, that
because the parties were not afforded an opportunity to brief or to have oral argument
concerning the new statute, the court should have first ascertained the statute's constitution-
ality. Furthermore, petitioner contended the retrospective effect of the statute conflicts with
FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 6 because the title of the enactment fails to give notice of the retrospec-
tivity. Petitioner cited Chiapetta v. Jordan, 16 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1944) as authority. Petitioner's
Petition for Rehearing at 7, Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
The court might have found, however, that the statute is essentially remedial in nature,
and does not have the effect of destroying any vested rights or property existing at the time.
See Respondent's Reply in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at 2, Lincenberg v. Issen, 318
So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
7. For example, in Lincenberg, the plaintiff's negligence (0 percent) would be compared
to the total of the defendants' (Lincenberg's and Rhode's) negligence (100 percent).
8. "[Sluch special verdicts may be desired and of assistance to the trial judge in per-
forming his equity responsibility under Section 3(c). To that end and for that purpose only,
the trial judge may in his discretion request special verdicts on the degrees of fault." 318 So.
2d at 393.
9. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1975) provides:
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.
(b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall
constitute a single share.
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall
apply.
The Commissioners' Comments to the 1955 Uniform Act, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 87
(1975) indicate that "pro rata" means equal shares except in situations where there is vicari-
ous or other common liability such that class liability need be treated as a single share. The
comments specifically describe the equity considerations mentioned in section 3(c) as where
there are at least three tortfeasors, one of which is insolvent. It is suggested that even in those
rare instances contribution should remain one-third rather than one-half.
Justice Boyd in his concurring opinion argued that the equity requirements of section
3(c) conflicted with the requirements of section 3(a). Therefore, in attempting to achieve
legislative intent and in order to hold the statute constitutional, the two sections should be
read together as requiring that relative degrees of fault be considered by the jury and the court
in fixing liability. 318 So. 2d at 394.
10. In dicta, the court indicated that in light of the principles underlying the Hoffman
decision, the court would have judicially adopted the right to contribution, had the Uniform
Act not been enacted.
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Examination of a problem concerning apportionment of dam-
ages should begin with an analysis of the interrelated, yet distinct
concepts of comparative negligence, joint and several liability, and
contribution among tortfeasors.
Comparative negligence, in some form, has been adopted either
by statute or judicial decision in a majority of jurisdictions. ' It was
developed through attempts to eliminate the harsh rule of contribu-
tory negligence which prohibited an injured plaintiff who was par-
tially at fault from recovering any damages. The idea was to replace
contributory negligence with a more equitable and just doctrine
which could apportion damages "according to the proportionate
fault of each party."'"
In Florida comparative negligence was adopted by the supreme
Therefore, although this Court has in the past recognized as viable the principle
of no contribution, in view of a re-examination of the principles of law and equity
and in light of Hoffman and public policy, as a matter of judicial policy, it would
be undesirable for this Court to retain a rule that under a system based on fault,
casts the entire burden of a loss for which several may be responsible upon only
one of those at fault, and for these reasons this Court recedes from its earlier
decisions to the contrary.
318 So. 2d at 391.
11. Comparative Negligence has been adopted by statute in the following jurisdictions:
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (Supp. 1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-201
(1973), as amended, § 13-21-111 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-572h (1975);
GA. CODE ANN. § 66-402 (1966), § 94-703 (1972), § 105-603 (1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-
31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258 (Supp. 1975);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1975); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1151 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507: 7-a (Supp. 1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1975-
76); N.D. CENT. CODE 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 18.470 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-802.1
(Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2212a § I
(Supp. 1975). UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp.
1975); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1975);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1975); WvO. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Comparative negligence has been judicially adopted in Florida in Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) and in California in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Both Florida and California adopted the pure form of
comparative negligence.
12. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973). See also C. HErr & C. HEn-,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971); Maloney,
From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV.
135 (1958); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Schwartz, Pure
Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 AM. TR. LAWYERS J. 117 (1972); Timmons & Silvis,
Pure Comparative Negligence in Florida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 737 (1974); 9 ARK. L. REV. 357 (1955).
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court in Hoffman v. Jones.'3 The Hoffman court found that the
common law rule of contributory negligence'4 violated public policy
in that it was clearly inequitable, and that there was no justification
for making one party (there, the plaintiff) bear the entire burden of
loss when two or more parties were at fault." The court stated:
If fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of
comparative negligence which involves apportionment of the loss
among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence is more
consistent with liability based on a fault premise ....
When the negligence of more than one person contributes to the
occurrence of an accident, each [person] should pay the propor-
tion of the total damages he has caused the other party."
Defendant Lincenberg attempted to analogize his situation to
these general equitable apportionment principles based on the
equation of liability with fault declared in Hoffman. He contended
that, as a negligent party, he should be held liable only for his
proportionate share of the damages." This contention would seem
to have merit despite the fact that "comparative negligence" gener-
ally, and Hoffman in particular, involve apportioning damages be-
tween a plaintiff and defendant. The specific holding"' of Hoffman
may be limited to the situation between a plaintiff and a defendant.
However, applying the principles of equity and the desire to equate
liability with fault espoused in that decision, it would seem logical
and just to apply those apportionment principles to all parties."
Holding a defendant tortfeasor who is only 15 percent at fault
liable for the entire amount of damages is obviously inconsistent
with the equitable principles involved in apportioning damages on
13. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
14. Contributory negligence was held to be the law of Florida in Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886), and was not overruled until Hoffman.
15. For a more detailed discussion of the court's reasoning see 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473
(1974).
16. 280 So. 2d at 436-37 (emphasis added).
17. The jury found Lincenberg's negligence to be 15 percent. Therefore, Lincenberg
contended his total liability should be limited to $3000 (15 percent of $20,000).
18. "Therefore, we now hold that a plaintiff in an action based on negligence will no
longer be denied any recovery because of his contributory negligence." 280 So. 2d at 438.
19. "A primary function of a court is to see that legal conflicts are equitably resolved.
In the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a court is the
equation of liability with fault." 280 So. 2d at 438. See also Timmons & Silvis, supra note
12, at 776-88.
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the basis of each person's relative degree of fault. However, if each
defendant was held responsible only for his proportionate share of
the damages, the common law doctrine of joint and several liability
would necessarily be abrogated or limited in its scope.'"
The origin of joint and several liability is a confusing one, prin-
cipally because it arose from separate theories. "Joint torts" origi-
nally meant liability for concerted action, but later came to include
situations where two or more persons owed a common duty, where
there was vicarious liability, and where there was concurrent negli-
gence resulting in a single injury.2 ' It is the latter situation with
which Lincenberg is concerned. Entire liability has traditionally
been imposed in such cases on the theory that damages cannot be
apportioned.2" Florida imposes entire or joint and several liability
where the result is traditionally labeled indivisible, such as when
two automobiles collide to injure a third person.23 However, the
question now becomes whether such an apportionment of damages
actually is possible, and if so, whether there remains any justifica-
tion for retaining joint and several liability.
There has been considerable controversy as to whether a jury
is capable of apportioning damages in multi-party automobile acci-
dents. At one time, Dean Prosser suggested that although such ap-
portionment would be the most equitable and theoretically sound
procedure, American juries were not sophisticated enough to handle
the complicated processes. 4 On the other hand, judges in Canada
have apportioned damages in multi-party actions for years.2 It has
been suggested that the Canadian and English statutory require-
20. It has been suggested that by the Hoffman court's decision "to allow a jury to
apportion fault as it sees fit between negligent parties . the court has ruled sub silentio
that joint and several liability can only exist where the jury could not make an apportion-
ment. Timmons & Silvis, supra note 12, at 781, quoting Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,
439 (Fla. 1973). See note 54 infra.
Retaining joint and several liability in concerted actions by several parties, however,
could be justified on the traditional policy grounds of discouraging such actions. Furthermore,
a plaintiff-victim would rarely, if ever, be partly responsible for his own injuries in such
situations.
21. For a detailed discussion of the history and theories of joint and several liability see
Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REv. 399 (1939) and Prosser, Joint 7orts
and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937).
22. Prosser, supra note 21, at 432.
23. Of course each defendant's negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury. See
cases cited in note 3 supra.
24. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 503-08 (1953).
25. Id. at 504.
[Vol. 30:747
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ments of joinder of all parties and apportionment of the damages
among all parties in proportion to their respective faults are superior
in those respects."I
Since the widespread implementation of comparative negli-
gence, however, such an apportionment has become more feasible,
even if not always easily computed in multi-party actions. Concep-
tually, if a jury is considered capable of apportioning fault between
two parties (a plaintiff and a defendant in the traditional compara-
tive negligence setting), it should not be any more difficult for a jury
to allocate fault among several parties (including more than one
defendant). The fact that the jury in Lincenberg seemed to have
little difficulty in assigning a percentage of fault to each of the
parties is evidence of the feasibility of such apportionment. Further-
more, the use of special verdicts2" might better enable a court to see
whether the jury properly performed its duty. Using a general ver-
dict with special interrogatories,2" however, would be less confusing
to the jury and would still serve the function of determining relative
degrees of fault consistent with Hoffman principles. Of course, if the
doctrine of joint and several liability were abrogated, simple general
verdicts as between each plaintiff and defendant could be made.
Therefore, in the absence of a strong reason to the contrary, it would
be logically inconsistent with the equity and fault apportionment
principles of Hoffman to discriminate against such apportionment
among all parties.29
26. See generally C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
(1936).
27. Hoffman provided for the use of special verdicts in negligence actions, but did not
make them mandatory. 280 So. 2d at 439. However, the Hoffman court probably did not
anticipate using common law special verdicts where the jury must make a special finding of
fact for each material legal issue. Florida does not have a statutory special verdict such as
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a). The Hoffman court may have envisioned the use of a general verdict
with special interrogatories. See 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 478-82 (1974).
Many commentators have been urging the use of special verdicts or special interrogato-
ries. See, e.g., C. GREGORY, supra note 26, at 121-24; Gregory, Loss Distribution by Compara-
tive Negligence, 21 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1936); Maloney, supra note 12, at 170-72; Tim-
mons & Silvis, supra note 12, at 800-02. Contra., Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in
Action, 34 AM. TR. LAWYERS J. 117, 131-35 (1972).
In Lincenberg, however, the court restricted the use of special verdicts to the extent that
they comply with the special equity requirements of FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(c) (1975). See
notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
28. Special interrogatories would not require a finding of fact on every material issue.
See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2512, at 524 (1971). The
special findings in Lincenberg were actually special interrogatories with a general verdict.
29. At least one state, New Hampshire provides for pure apportionment of damages
among all parties. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507: 7-a (Supp. 1973) provides:
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One such strong reason may be the social policy favoring pro-
tection of the injured plaintiff in case of an execution-proof defen-
dant or a defendant that cannot be brought before the court.3 While
the goal of preventing an injured plaintiff from bearing the entire
burden in such cases is certainly valid, there are alternative means
of allocating the burden. One alternative is that a partially negli-
gent plaintiff and the solvent defendant(s) would share the burden
based on the ratio of their comparative fault."
In the event that either the court or the legislature deems it
necessary to retain joint and several liability as presently applied,
a second solution to the inconsistency and conflict with the Hoffman
decision is to allow contribution among tortfeasors based on their
relative degrees of fault. In fact, contribution would only exist in
situations where there was joint and several liability. Otherwise, a
defendant would never have to pay more than his fair share in the
first place.
The common law did not allow contribution, 2 but in recent
years the harshness of such a rule has become increasingly appar-
ent. : :' Contribution would recognize the commonly accepted doc-
trine of joint and several liability, but would allow defendants to
recover from one another to the extent they have paid the plaintiff
more than their share of the common liability. The problem again
[Elach such defendant shall be liable for that portion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the
amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants ....
:30. See Timmons & Silvis, supra note 12, at 784.
31. Id. at 785-86. Note, however, that in Lincenberg comparing plaintiff's negligence to
that of a solvent defendant would not make any difference since the plaintiff was not negli-
gent.
32. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American Dist, Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla.
330, 143 So. 316 (Fla. 1932); Stembler v. Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Kellen-
berger v. Widener, 159 So. 2d 267 (Fla, 2d Dist. 1963).
The no contribution rule had its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101
Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). Some often stated reasons for the rule were: (1) the court's desire not
to aid anyone with "unclean hands"; (2) the possible deterrent effect because it serves as a
warning to potential wrongdoers; and (3) possible administrative problems involving any
contribution. See Prosser, supra note 21, at 425-26.
33, The harshness of the rule can be demonstrated by the facts of this case. Lincenberg
who is only 15 percent at fault could be held responsible for 100 percent of the damages if
the plaintiff sought execution against him. Even if a state recognizes contribution, inequities
still result unless contribution is done by apportioning damages on the basis of relative
degrees of fault. See note 35 infra for an example of the inequities.
The majority of jurisdictions now allow contribution either by statute or judicial fiat. See
cases and statutes cited in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 390 n.1 (Fla. 1975).
[Vol. 30:747
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lies in how to apportion such recovery. If the principles of Hoffman34
are followed, recovery would necessarily be based on relative degrees
of fault. However, the Uniform Act provides that the determination
must be made on a pro rata basis without consideration of the
relative degrees of fault. 5
Given these principles of comparative negligence, joint and sev-
eral liability, and contribution among tortfeasors, an analysis of the
legal issues presented in Lincenberg should have answered the fol-
lowing questions:
1. Do the equitable principles based on the equation of liabil-
ity with fault espoused in Hoffman have broader applications than
a mere comparison of a plaintiff's negligence with that of the defen-
dants?
2. If so, is Lincenberg's contention that each party must be
held liable only for that percentage of fault for which he is adjudged
guilty correct, thereby in essence abrogating or limiting the applica-
tion of joint and several liability?
3. If the court chooses not to so abrogate or limit the doctrine
of joint and several liability, would allowing contribution among
joint tortfeasors provide nearly the same net result in most cases?"
4. If contribution is allowed, what method of apportionment
should be employed?
In Lincenb erg the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the
equitable apportionment principles espoused in Hoffman should
have broader application than permitting a plaintiff recovery for
damages if he was partially at fault. Because of those equitable
principles and public policy, the court renounced the common law
rule that prohibited contribution."
34. Hoffman did not rule on the question of contribution because the issue was not
"ripe," and also apparently because it was under the belief there was sufficient applicable
case authority in existence based on a comparative negligence railroad statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 768.06 (1911), held unconstitutional in Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bott. Co., 175 So.
2d 39 (Fla. 1965). There does not, however, seem to be sufficient precedent under that statute.
See Timmons & Silvis, supra note 12, at 777.
35. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975). Therefore, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff
could still recover 100 percent from Lincenberg, but Lincenberg would be entitled to contribu-
tion from Rhodes. However, since relative degrees of fault are not to be considered, Lincen-
berg could only get 50 percent contribution from Rhodes. The effect of course would be that
Lincenberg must pay for 35 percent of the liability for which he was not negligent.
36. The only difference, in effect, would be when one defendant is insolvent or nonjoina-
ble. Timmons & Silvis, supra note 12, at 789-91.
37. See note 10 supra.
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Unfortunately, the court essentially failed to explore the second
question in its analysis. The real issue in Lincenberg was whether
or not the jury could apportion fault as between all parties to the
action, thus eliminating the traditional joint and several liability
situation. Lincenberg was not seeking contribution from Rhodes,
but was contending he should only be required to pay the plaintiff
15 percent of the damages. Instead of focusing on the social policies
for and against limiting the scope of joint and several liability (i.e.,
the desire to equate liability with fault versus the desire to provide
an injured plaintiff with full compensation for his injuries), the
court centered its analysis on the collateral issue of contribution. In
fact the court's only reference" to joint and several liability followed
its full discussion of the merits of establishing the right to contribu-
tion in Florida.
Perhaps the court was persuaded that the legislature in-
tended39 to codify joint and several liability in passing the Uniform
Act. Yet a literal reading of the statute would tend to indicate that
only "when" joint and several liability is found should the defend-
ant-joint tortfeasors be allowed relief in the form of receiving con-
tribution if one has paid more than his share of the common lia-
bility.'" While this distinction is subtle, it is of paramount import-
ance.
If, however, the legislature truly intended to codify the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability, the court should not abro-
gate the doctrine. This would be true even though the concept of
joint and several liability is somewhat inconsistent with the princi-
ples espoused in Hoffman since the legislature could be recognizing
the strong social policy toward protecting an injured plaintiff's right
to recover his damages. 1 Furthermore, the alternative solution, con-
tribution, could have nearly the same net effect except in cases
where a defendant is execution-proof or unavailable.2 Of course, the
court, in the absence of legislative action to the contrary, should be
38. The court makes one brief reference to the issue in stating: "The Act retains the full,
joint, and several liability of joint tortfeasors to the plaintiff .... " 318 So. 2d at 392.
However, the court does not explain how it reached such an important conclusion.
39. The legislative history is too scant to help determine to what extent joint and several
liability was to be retained. It should be assumed that the legislature was aware of Hoffman
and its apportionment principles based on equating liability with fault. If the legislature
wanted to codify joint and several liability in such cases it surely would have stated such
intention clearly. It cannot be presumed that because the legislature provided for contribu-
tion it necessarily considered the bounds of what constitutes joint and several liability.
40. See FLA. STAT. §§ 768.31 (2)(a), (b) (1975).
41. See generally Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
42. See note 36 .upra.
[Vol. 30:747
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free to determine the continued viability of joint and several liabil-
ity since it is a common law doctrine.43
In fact, however, neither the legislature nor the court squarely
confronted this, the central issue of the case. Consequently, the
court could not discuss in a logical fashion the collateral issue of
contribution because it had not yet thoroughly examined to what
extent joint and several liability is still valid.44 If the purpose of the
Uniform Act was to retain the status quo regarding joint and several
liability, the legislature should have stated it clearly or it should be
apparent from the legislative history.45 Perhaps the court believed
that the issue was too controversial, and that if contribution was
allowed, both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' bar would be rela-
tively content.4" What the court did not consider, though, was that
because the Uniform Act prohibits consideration of the relative de-
grees of fault in determining the pro rata shares of contribution,47
the statute is clearly inconsistent with Hoffman and the equation
of liability with fault." Furthermore, there are no strong public
policy reasons that justify this inconsistency because the policy of
insuring a plaintiff compensation for his injuries in case of an insol-
vent or unavailable defendant is not relevant in a contribution set-
ting since joint and several liability is retained.
The net result of Lincenberg and the Uniform Act is, of course,
a serious conflict with the principles equating liability with fault.
Despite the weak opinion and poor statutory provision, there are
three possible solutions which would bring some kind of order to the
apportionment system. The first alternative is a statutory
change-replacing the "pro rata" provision with one based on rela-
tive degrees of fault. 9 The effect of such a change would result in a
Bielski v. Schulze' " situation, where joint and several liability is
43. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973).
44. At least not with respect to the Lincenberg case since it did not involve contribution.
45. See note 40 supra.
46. Clearly defendants are now in a better position in that the institution of some right
to contribution, even if recovery is determined on a pro rata basis, is more equitable than
the former no contribution rule. While the plaintiffs' bar might not seriously object to contri-
bution, if the court were to abrogate or limit the doctrine of joint and several liability, the
plaintiffs' bar undoubtedly would object.
47. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975).
48. For a more detailed discussion see Comment, The Case for Comparative Contribu-
tion in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1976).
49. See id. at 736-37.
50. 16 Wisc. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recog-
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retained, but contribution among joint tortfeasors is allowed on a
proportionate basis.
The second option would be to find the "pro rata" provision
unconstitutional. Such a finding would have the same net effect as
a legislative change, but the route is more tenuous."' Perhaps the
court thought that by specifically not ruling on the constitutionality
of the statute, 2 it could remedy the situation later, should it become
necessary. The problem is that if the statute is held to be constitu-
tional, even though grossly unfair, 3 in order to maintain consistency
in the state's apportionment system, the court would have to either
hope the legislature will repeal the "pro rata" provision, or be forced
to answer the question it failed to consider in Lincenberg by ruling
decisively that fault must be apportioned by today's jury among all
parties.
Finally, the third alternative is for the court to re-examine the
joint and several liability issue and its earlier unexplained state-
ment concerning the Uniform Act's supposed retention of that doc-
trine. If the court, after weighing carefully the equitable principles
underlying Hoffman against the policy of protecting a plaintiff's
recovery at all costs, did abrogate or limit the scope of the tradi-
tional doctrine of joint and several liability, Florida could have a
truly pure apportionment system. Joint and several liability might
thus be drastically limited in scope, perhaps reducing the effective-
ness of the "pro rata" provision to the few instances where appor-
tionment was actually impossible. 4
nized the traditional joint and several liability, but judicially declared that the right of
contribution exists and is measured according to the relative degrees of fault.
51. A discussion of the constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 768.31 is beyond the scope of
this case note. It is unlikely, however, that the statute violates either the equal protection or
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment despite the fact that the statute is unfair.
Furthermore, arguments that the statute violates Florida equal protection or due process
requirements are unlikely to be successful. For a more detailed discussion of the constitution-
ality of the statute see Comment, supra note 48, at 731-36.
52. 318 So. 2d at 391 n. *
53. See note 51 supra.
54. Joint and several liability could be retained only in those instances where a jury could
not logically apportion damages or assess fault among all parties. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (where a victim was caught in a cross fire between two hunters
and it was impossible to determine which hunter fired the fatal bullet); Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (where all assisting hospital personnel were held jointly
liable when none of those upon whom the burden had rested could cast the guilt). See also
Lawrence v. Hethcox, 283 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1973) (where plaintiff was involved in two separate
accidents and it may have been impossible to apportion to each tortfeasor the amount of
damages caused by him).
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Merely redefining what constitutes joint and several liability
would have two principal advantages over completely abrogating
the doctrine. The first is that joint and several liability could be
retained for concerted actions by the tortfeasors,55 and perhaps also
for vicarious liability situations." The second advantage is that the
new contribution statute would not be affected; contribution would
still be allowed "when" joint and several liability existed. In those
cases, a "pro rata" distribution would not be objectionable since the
jury could not actually allocate a percentage of fault to the various
tortfeasors.
Whether the doctrine of joint and several liability should be
abrogated or limited in its scope is a question which engenders great
debate and controversy. However, if the supreme court had ana-
lyzed in a logical fashion the issues involved in Lincenberg, it would
have explored and resolved that very question before addressing the
issue of contribution. In any case it is hoped that the present conflict
between the Hoffman principles of equating liability with fault and
the legislature's "pro rata" contribution will be rectified in the near
future.**
JEFFREY R. SURLAS
Another solution would be to allow plaintiff to recover only a pro rata share of the liability
from each defendant, rather than allowing plaintiff to choose which defendant from whom
he will seek execution. Such a solution would be unjustified if there was any concerted act ion
by the tortfeasors, however. See note 20 supra.
55. See note 20 supra.
56. The corresponding right to indemnity may be sufficient protection for the vicarious
tortfeasor.
** Subsequent to the writing of this article, but prior to the final printing of this issue,
the Florida Legislature amended Florida statutes section 768.31(3)(a) to provide that, in
determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors, "their relative degrees of fault shall he the basis
for allocation of liability." Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-183, amending FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a)
(1975). This amendment takes effect on June 21, 1976.
This legislative change brings needed order and consistency to Florida's apportionment
system. However, because contribution will now be based on relative degrees of fault, the
supreme court may be even more unwilling to re-examine what constitutes the proper scope
of joint and several liability. Although allowing contribution based on relative degrees of fault
would generally have the same net effect as eliminating joint and several liability, there are
situations where the distinction would be notable. In cases where a defendant is either non-
joinable or execution-proof or where one defendant settles with or receives a release from the
plaintiff, eliminating joint and several liability would have a significant impact on the rights
of the parties. Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida may still be forced to face and resolve the
difficult competing policies centered around the doctrine of joint and several liability and the
desire to equate liability with fault.
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